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A rebound of consumption, investment, and consumer confidence in the
second half of 2003 has raised hopes that the U.S.economic recovery from
the 2001 recession is on a sustainable course. According to this brief by
Philip Arestis and Elias Karakitsos, however, the trend in the short-term
factors affecting the economy has changed for the better, but long-term
factors remain at risk. Slow, rather than rapid, economic growth is better
in 2004, the authors say, as rapid growth would result in higher long-term
interest rates, which would threaten the property market boom and
weaken investment in 2005 and beyond. The authors are sure, however,
that the current administration will find it difficult to refrain from addi-
tional procyclical fiscal stimulus in light of the upcoming presidential elec-
tion. The result could lead to a rapidly declining U.S. economic growth
rate following the election in November.
The 2001 recession was very mild, thanks to the resilience of con-
sumers, the buoyancy of real disposable income and the housing market,
and easy fiscal policy (low interest rates and tax cuts). The business cycle
following the 2001 recession, the authors observe, has been characterized
by the highest private consumption level, but the weakest investment
recovery, of all previous recessions. The current cycle is further character-
ized by more pronounced job losses combined with the slowest increase in
average weekly hours of work, and a reduction in earnings for parts of the
labor force.
Arestis and Karakitsos point out that contrary to the encouraging
news in the short term, real estate costs, as a percentage of disposable
income, and household debt service are at an all-time high, and the prop-
erty boom was financed by debt accumulation. Furthermore, despite the
buoyant economic recovery, employers are borrowing very cautiously.
Although companies are restructuring their balance sheets faster than
Preface6 Public Policy Brief, No. 77
during any other business cycle, part of this success comes from such one-
off measures as income tax cuts,depreciation incentives,and lower geopo-
litical risks,and from larger government deficits.In addition,the benefit of
switching into long-term debt has hindered the economic recovery.
Using a consumption and investment model of the U.S. economy, the
authors assess the long-term risks to consumption and investment under
two alternative scenarios: a weak and a strong economic recovery in 2004.
If the recovery is weak, they find that consumption and investment peak
early in 2004 and decelerate to the end of 2005. Economic fundamentals
such as tighter monetary policy, declining profitability, and restructuring
of corporate balance sheets deteriorate, and profitability declines as a
result of robust job creation. The economy, however, continues to grow at
3 percent by the end of 2004,which would help the current administration
in the presidential election. If there is a strong recovery (4.6 percent), the
authors call for tighter monetary policy in the second quarter of 2004, but
foresee that the Fed could afford to wait until after the election. The delay
would cause the growth rate in 2005 to fall to only 1.4 percent.
Although the average growth rate over the 2004–2005 period is the
same for both scenarios, the first scenario implies low growth volatility
and high inflation volatility, whereas the second scenario implies high
growth volatility and low inflation volatility. Likely policy actions by the
current administration are seen to result in a precipitous decline in con-
sumption and investment,which drags the economy into recession toward
the end of 2005.
As always, I welcome your comments.
Dimitri Papadimitriou, President
May 2004The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 7
Introduction
The current anemic economic recovery in the United States stems from
weak investment, owing to excess capacity created during the “New
Economy” bubble in the second half of the 1990s. In the aftermath of the
bursting of the bubble, the consumer has been on a tightrope, as losses in
equity markets have been partly offset by gains in real estate and as fiscal
support and mortgage refinancing have been partly offset by consumer
cautiousness.
Imbalances in the corporate sector,which take time for correction,are
preventing investment from picking up and laying the foundation for a
new long-lasting economic expansion. Meanwhile, the fragile consumer
might contribute to a deep and protracted recession if the economy stum-
bled in light of risks, such as a jobless recovery and a growing personal-
sector imbalance that is fueled by a property bubble. Tax reductions may
create a cyclical upturn in the U.S.economy in the short run,but this kind
of government policy is unsustainable in the long run.
In this brief, we review the short- and long-term factors that affect
consumption and investment in the U.S. economy. We subsequently sim-
ulate our models of consumption and investment in an attempt to exam-
ine the likely impact of the factors on the U.S. economy.
Recent Behavior of Consumption and Investment
Figure 1 shows the pattern of real consumer expenditures for eight quar-
ters before and after the trough of recession.To simplify comparisons,four
lines are shown: the average of five demand-led recessions in the 1947–72
period; the average of three supply-led recessions in the 1973–84 period;
the 1991 recession; and the 2001 recession. Consumption during the 2001
The Sustainability of Economic Recovery 
in the United States8 Public Policy Brief, No. 77
recession fared better than any other business cycle, decelerating from an
annual rate of 5.1 percent to 1.8 percent before resuming higher growth.A
rebound of consumption in the second half of 2003, coupled with rising
consumer confidence, has raised hopes that the economic recovery is on a
sustainable path.
Real gross private domestic investment in fixed capital is the most
volatile component of aggregate demand that invariably leads an econ-
omy into recession. Investment fell 11 percent in the three quarters lead-
ing up to the trough of the 2001 recession compared with an average of
15 percent in the last ten recessions. Investment peaked in the second
quarter of 2000, bottomed twice in 2001, recovered strongly in the first
quarter of 2002, but lost steam until March 2003. To a large extent, the
spectacular recovery of investment in the first quarter of 2002 reflected
the end of destocking and the introduction of depreciation incentives on
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investment in equipment and software. Replacement investment also
played a role (e.g., the rush to buy computers before 2000 resulted in the
need to replace them by 2003). Residential investment has been the
strongest component of investment because of the buoyancy of the hous-
ing market.
Figure 2 shows the behavior of investment before and after the trough
of recession.Since investment bottoms either at the trough of the business
cycle,or at a one-quarter lag,it is a coincident or lagging indicator.The fall
in investment in the 2001 recession—3.4 percent of GDP—was the steep-
est of all recessions. Moreover, investment grew just 1 percent of GDP in
the first two years after the trough, thereby making the recovery from the
2001 recession the weakest of all recessions.
The causes of the anemic recovery are the balance-sheet problems of
the business and personal sectors (because of prior budget surpluses). In
Source: Authors’ calculations
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the last two quarters of 2003, however, investment growth has accelerated,
thereby raising hopes that the recovery is sustainable. There are downside
risks to this expectation, however, which we explore below (Arestis and
Karakitsos 2003a, 2003b).
Short-Run Factors Affecting Consumption and Investment 
Short-run factors are factors that affect the economy over the next 12 months.
A.Consumption
The most important determinant of consumption is real disposable
income,which is equal to personal income less taxes and adjusted for infla-
tion in consumer prices. Although personal income and wages and
salaries,which account for more than half of personal income,continue to
recover from the 2001 recession, they are growing at a pace that is below
the recovery following the 1991 recession (Arestis and Karakitsos 2004).
The recovery in wages and salaries is uniform across services, distributive
industries, and manufacturing, but continues to fall in nominal terms in
manufacturing.
Although personal income grew only 2.4 percent in the first year of
recovery (November 2001 to November 2002), disposable personal
income grew 7.3 percent. The wide gap, which has since narrowed to less
than 1 percent, was due to the fiscal support of the personal sector. Taxes
as a percent of disposable income declined from a peak of 18.3 percent in
March 2001 to 12.6 percent in October 2003 (ibid.).
The pattern of consumption in the recent downturn has followed that
of real personal disposable income, although the latter has been much
more volatile as households have attempted to smooth consumption in the
face of variable incomes caused by the business cycle and changes in taxes
and subsidies. The growth rate of real personal disposable income peaked
at 5.6 percent a year before the trough and bottomed at 0.3 percent a quar-
ter after the trough (ibid.). The volatile pattern is not dissimilar to the
average demand-led and supply-led business cycles.
During a second round of retrenchment by the corporate sector, the
growth rate of real disposable income was more than halved—from 5.7
percent in November 2002 to 2.4 percent in April 2003—but it acceleratedThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 11
in the second half of 2003, thanks to new tax cuts. What are the prospects
for growth of real disposable income?
Companies usually cut the number of hours in the workweek during a
downswing of the business cycle and restore the number of hours in an
upswing. In the current cycle, weekly hours were cut, on average, 1.5
hours—a pattern not dissimilar to previous cycles.However,average weekly
hours have increased merely 0.7 hours during the early stages of the current
recovery, which is the slowest pace of all cycles. Even worse, average weekly
hours were cut during the recovery in the second round of retrenchment,as
companies attempted to restore profitability and healthy balance sheets.
Job losses have been more pronounced than other cycles (ibid.). Job
creation peaked nineteen months before the trough at 305,000 new jobs
per month and bottomed two months after the trough at 234,000 job
losses per month, which was the steepest decline in the last ten business
cycles.Moreover,job creation in the recovery phase has been more anemic
than that following the 1991 recession and,even worse,job losses resumed
during the second round of retrenchment in spite of higher profits and
balance sheet improvements.
Companies not only cut the workweek and laid off workers, but also
managed, for the first time, to reduce the earnings of the labor force as a
result of flexible labor markets introduced in the late 1980s and early
1990s. Real hourly earnings rose by only 2 percent from the trough of the
cycle, but have since fallen to a new low. In the second half of 2003, how-
ever, earnings started to increase, which provides additional evidence that
the recovery is sustainable.
Overall, the 2001 recession was very mild thanks to the resilience of
consumers and to the buoyancy of real disposable income from easy fiscal
policy. During the double-dip recession of the industrial sector that was
caused by a second round of retrenchment, companies cut the average
workweek, laid-off workers, reduced the hourly earnings of workers, and
slashed investment. The slower growth in real disposable income caused a
deceleration in the growth of consumption. The picture has changed
markedly in the second half of 2003. Retrenchment was successful in
restoring profitability and improving balance sheets, so wages have begun
to rise, job creation has resumed (albeit sluggishly), and average weekly
hours have increased. The latest round of tax cuts has also bolstered real12 Public Policy Brief, No. 77
disposable income and will likely boost consumption. Therefore, all the
short-run factors affecting consumption have improved and any risks to
consumption will come from long-run factors.
B.Investment
Investment must improve before the recovery is sustainable.This implies a
recovery in profits and capacity utilization. However, capacity utilization
kept falling during the first 18 months of recovery, which suggests that
excess capacity was installed in the latter half of the 1990s and was not
absorbed in spite of resilient consumption. In the period from May to
December 2003,capacity utilization rose to 74.5 percent from 72.6 percent,
thereby raising hopes that excess capacity might be absorbed if demand
continued at a high rate.
Figure 3 shows the growth rate of nonfarm, nonfinancial corporate
profits per unit of output. This measure is clearly a coincident or leading
indicator of the trough of the business cycle. Unit profits bottomed three
quarters before the trough of the 2001 recession and recovered sharply for
a brief period,thanks to the one-off incentives for depreciation.Unit prof-
its peaked just two quarters after the trough and subsequently decelerated
for a year, as the effect of one-off incentives faded away. Profits have
rebounded strongly in the last two quarters and have raised hopes that the
worst is over, but part of the rebound has been caused by depreciation
incentives in the 2003 fiscal package (a one-off factor).
Profit margins depend on unit labor costs in relation to pricing
power, so they cannot improve until unit labor costs peak and begin to
decline. Unit labor costs, a leading indicator of the trough of the business
cycle, peaked three quarters before the trough of the 2001 recession and
bottomed a year after the trough. The deterioration in unit labor costs
triggered a new round of retrenchment in the corporate sector,which suc-
cessfully reduced unit labor costs in the following two quarters. The end
of the Iraq war, the dissipation of uncertainty, the decline of the dollar,
and the accommodative fiscal and monetary policy have also improved
the outlook for profits. These events bode well for a sustained recovery in
investment.
Another factor requiring correction before a sustainable economic recov-
ery is the liquidation of inventories of unsold goods.The inventory-to-salesThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 13
ratio in manufacturing is a leading indicator of the trough of the business
cycle, preceding it by one or two months. In the current cycle, the ratio
peaked four months before the trough and bottomed nine months after
the trough, before increasing slightly in the following seven months.
In a typical cycle, production resumes after excess inventories are liq-
uidated. Hence industrial production is a lagging indicator of the trough
of the business cycle by one or two months.In the recent downturn it bot-
tomed two months after the trough, and the recovery fizzled after the first
year. During the second round of retrenchment, production cuts led to a
double-dip recession in manufacturing,but a reduction in unit labor costs,
the restoration of profits, and lean inventories paved the way for a growth
in production. The upturn in the last nine months is not an aberration,
but confirmation of a new trend.
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Overall, investment has been lackluster in the last two years and has
played a significant role in an anemic recovery.Because investment improved
in the last two quarters of 2003, however, our analysis suggests a change in
trend, as all short-run factors that affect investment have improved.
Long-Run Factors Affecting Consumption and Investment 
A.Consumption
An increase in the savings ratio contributed to an anemic recovery in the
early 1990s. In the 2001 downturn, the savings ratio also increased by
approximately the same amount: from 1.9 percent seven quarters before
the trough to 3.5 percent eight quarters after the trough (Arestis and
Karakitsos 2004).The outlook for the savings ratio over the next two years
will determine the fate of the latest tax cuts and the income boost from
higher employment in stimulating consumption.
In a leveraged economy the savings ratio moves countercyclically: i.e.,
it falls in a boom and rises in a recession. This trend occurred in the early
1990s and in current business cycles. In the short run, consumption
depends on real disposable income and the savings ratio. The factors that
determine the savings ratio are net wealth and the degree of uncertainty
about job security and income growth (Frowen and Karakitsos 1996).
Figure 4 shows net wealth as a percentage of disposable income during
various business cycles. In the most recent and longest bull market
(1982–2000),net wealth steadily increased,leading to a steady decline in the
savings ratio. During the second half of the 1990s, net wealth rose to
unprecedented levels and the savings ratio fell precipitously until the peak
of the bubble. When equity prices declined during the period from March
2000 to March 2003,net wealth subsequently fell toward its long-term aver-
age (480 percent of disposable income),while the savings ratio increased to
4 percent. Between the peak of the bubble (March 2000) and the trough of
the business cycle (September 2001), financial assets fell $6.8 trillion, while
rising property prices boosted the value of tangible assets by $3.3 trillion.
Thus the erosion of gross wealth was limited to $3.5 trillion (see Table 1).
The latest figures from the third quarter of 2003 show that the picture has
changed,as losses in financial assets narrowed to $3.6 trillion,while tangible
assets soared to $4.6 trillion. Gross wealth is now $1 trillion higher than itThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 15
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was at the peak of the bubble.This is impressive,and could lead one to con-
clude that consumption is no longer a problem. What matters, though, is
net wealth rather than gross wealth, and net wealth has not recovered.
Real estate as a percentage of disposable income is at an all-time high
(191 percent). Unfortunately, the property boom was financed by debt
accumulation, which reached 110 percent of disposable income by the
third quarter of 2003. Since the peak of the equity bubble, debt has
increased $2.5 trillion, so the $1-trillion gain in gross wealth becomes a
$1.5-trillion loss in net wealth. Although this imbalance has narrowed
from $5 trillion,it remains worrisome,since it can only be corrected either
through retrenchment by the personal sector that raises the savings ratio,
or by a rebound in asset prices. Now that economic recovery is under way,
it is less likely that the personal sector will respond to the imbalance
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Job security and income growth depend on the outlook of the corpo-
rate sector. It has been argued elsewhere (ibid.) that although the outlook
for corporate profits and investment has improved, substantial risks
remain.The newly proposed fiscal package by the U.S.government is con-
troversial because it is intended to be tight, but may turn easy when it
becomes law. The Bush administration has called for permanent tax cuts
that are financed by spending cuts.The government may find it difficult to
cut expenditures and unable to resist endorsing the proposed tax cuts.
Moreover, President Bush is unlikely to veto increased expenditures in an
election year. Although another fiscal boost would ensure that investment
is booming at the time of the presidential election,higher long-term inter-
est rates could weaken investment in 2005 and threaten the property mar-
ket boom. Furthermore, if an economic boom in 2004 leads to strong job
creation, then the growth in corporate profits will decline. These factors
could affect consumer confidence in 2005. Deteriorating business and
consumer outlooks could induce households to curb their spending, and
the savings ratio would rise—an unlikely risk in 2004, but not in 2005.
Unemployment has declined to 5.7 percent of the labor force from its
peak of 6.3 percent in June 2003. It could fall further if economic growth
is strong in 2004. However, the official measure of unemployment may
hide the strength of job creation because many discouraged workers dur-
ing the downturn would probably return to the labor force.Hence the sav-
ings ratio is unlikely to be affected in 2004, but it would rise in 2005 if the
risk factors materialized.
In spite of low interest rates and refinancing, household debt service
costs are at an all-time high and are extremely worrisome (ibid.). The
components of the financial obligations ratio, a broader measure than the
debt-service ratio, are also at an all-time high. If interest rates rose, then
households would find it difficult to service their debt and the savings
ratio would rise. With growth at potential output, the Fed should tighten
interest rates in the second quarter of 2004, but, with rapid growth, it
could afford to wait. The required degree of tightening, though, would be
greater in 2005 and would precipitate a retrenchment of the personal sec-
tor and a higher savings ratio (ibid.).
There is a risk to consumption from strong economic growth in
2004 that is a result of further fiscal policy measures by the government.18 Public Policy Brief, No. 77
Investment would soften in 2005 because of higher long-term interest rates,
and profitability would decline because of strong job creation in 2004. The
deteriorating outlook for the corporate sector may induce caution on the
part of consumers and raise the savings ratio. Higher long-term interest
rates may also cause lower house prices and lead to falling prices of finan-
cial assets. The personal-sector imbalance would widen once more, and
retrenchment could be the inevitable price. This scenario would be aggra-
vated by debt-servicing costs that are already at an all-time high.
B.Investment
In every business cycle,debt levels have increased.In demand-led business
cycles, debt as a  percentage of GDP peaked at 28 percent at the trough,
while in supply-led business cycles, it peaked at 33 percent. In contrast,
debt soared to 43 percent in the 1991 recession and to 47 percent in the
2001 recession (Arestis and Karakitsos 2004).
High debt levels require expensive servicing and large volumes of new
debt issues to replenish maturing debt.In an economic downswing,though,
access to capital markets and terms of issuance deteriorate.Therefore,com-
panies are forced to cut credit that is poised to finance investment and to
focus on refinancing existing obligations.These actions combined with low
product demand translate into an anemic recovery.
In the current downturn, debt levels rose during the recovery phase,
a trend that has since reversed in light of the dramatic drop in the last two
quarters (3.5 percent of GDP) in response to the growth rate exceeding
the rate of debt accumulation. Debt reduction indicates that corporate-
balance-sheet restructuring and government deficit spending are working,
which bodes well for a recovery of investment. However, the net worth of
the corporate sector has fallen 2.4 percent of GDP in the last two quarters
and this trend signals that successful restructuring is not over yet.
The rate of growth of corporate debt peaks one or two years before the
trough (ibid.). In the average demand- and supply-led business cycles, the
growth rate of debt bottomed at a positive rate two quarters after the
trough.By comparison,the growth rate of corporate debt in the early 1990s
bottomed at a negative rate three quarters after the trough. For the first
time, firms reduced debt levels in order to restore the financial health of
their balance sheets. In the recent downturn, the annual demand for creditThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 19
declined from 11.2 to 1.4 percent five quarters after the trough and increased
slightly thereafter.Hence companies are borrowing very cautiously despite
the buoyant economic recovery in the second half of 2003.
Debt leverage,as measured by the stock of debt as a percentage of inter-
nal funds (net cash flow), affects other company decisions. Although com-
panies usually cut the growth rate of debt in the downswing of the business
cycle, internal funds decline faster, so the debt leverage increases. The
reverse occurs during an economic recovery (ibid.). In the current down-
turn, the debt leverage soared 170 percent, but fell 204 percent in recovery.
Hence companies managed to restructure their balance sheets faster than
any other business cycle,although part of this success resulted from one-off
measures, which boosted profits, and larger government deficits.
Retrenchment depends on the ease of refinancing the stock of debt,
and the service burden is based on profits and net cash flow. The more
companies rely on long-term debt, the easier it is to sustain a high level of
debt in a cyclical downturn, all else being equal. In the average demand
and supply-led business cycles,the ability of firms to switch from short- to
long-term debt was limited.In contrast,companies during the 1991 down-
turn found it easier to switch, despite higher debt levels. In the recent
downturn, companies switched into long-term debt earlier than before,
and the switch amounted to almost 11 percent of total debt. The switch to
more long-term debt in the last two business cycles represents a reversal of
a long-term trend (the ratio of long-term debt to total debt was 53 percent
in 1985, but it is 71 percent today).
The benefit of switching, however, depends on the relative cost of
finance between capital markets and banks. In this context it is worth
mentioning that the Fed dropped interest rates during the recent down-
turn much faster and more aggressively than in the early 1990s. But the
benefit of switching into long-term debt in the current business cycle has
quickly disappeared.In the first year of the recovery,it was more expensive
for high-grade companies to borrow from capital markets than from
banks. Hence the switch to long-term debt became a hindrance in recov-
ery. This situation may not improve if yields on sovereign debt increase
further and put upward pressure on corporate bond yields.
For low-grade companies the situation is worse. In the 1991 business
cycle it became more expensive to borrow from the capital markets than20 Public Policy Brief, No. 77
from the banks, which was another reason why the recovery was anemic.
In the first year of the current recovery,the situation was worse than in the
early 1990s,as the large switch into long-term debt was misconceived.The
rate spread increased by nearly 5 percentage points and made borrowing
from the capital markets totally unattractive, thereby contributing to the
worst economic recovery. The situation has improved marginally in the
second year of recovery (the rate spread declined by 0.5 percentage
points), but the risk of rising spreads because of burgeoning budget
deficits does not bode well for future investment.
The extent of the damage from long-term debt depends on the effect
of the service burden on profits and net cash flow.Debt-service costs in the
current cycle are only 14.6 percent of net cash flow (down from 19.3 per-
cent at the peak). This is less than the average supply-led and early-1990s
business cycles.The debt-service burden may not be the key variable in the
current economic recovery.
Overall, the long-run analysis suggests that debt levels and leverage in
the latest downturn are higher than in previous recessions, but debt levels
are declining as a result of brisk economic growth, and interest rates are
lower than other business cycles.Debt-service costs are the lowest in thirty
years, and credit risk has abated somewhat. The long-run factors affecting
investment have improved dramatically in the last six months, paving the
way for a sustained recovery in investment.
The analysis so far enables us to construct models of U.S. consump-
tion and investment behavior.In the next two sections we summarize both
briefly,beginning with the consumption model (seeArestis and Karakitsos
2004 for full details).
The Consumption Model
In the very long run (a period of many business cycles), consumption and
real disposable income grow at the same rate, so the ratio of consumption
to income is constant. In the short run (i.e., a business cycle), consump-
tion can deviate substantially from income.
In the short run, consumption depends on real disposable income,
the savings ratio, and the rate of interest. The wealth effect is very
important in this theoretical framework, and has long-lasting effects.The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 21
















Higher unemployment or a decline in consumer confidence increases
uncertainty regarding job security and income growth, and raises the
savings ratio, which lowers consumption.An increase in the interest rate
also lowers consumption if the substitution effect is higher than the
income effect.
The rationale of the consumption model is summarized in Figure 5.
Shocks to the income spiral are introduced by monetary policy through
changes in interest rates,by fiscal policy through taxes and subsidies,and by
the corporate sector through wages,employment,and consumer price index
(CPI) inflation. The increase in consumption from a shock is not explosive,
as the income-consumption loop is stable. The stability is ensured if the22 Public Policy Brief, No. 77
extra boost to consumption from a small increase in disposable income (the
marginal propensity to consume) and net wealth is less than unity.
For example, assume that the economy is in long-run equilibrium, so
that the income spiral is idle.Now consider a shock in policy or the state of
the corporate sector that stimulates real disposable income.This would lead
to higher savings, which increases gross wealth. The extra wealth would be
invested in financial or tangible assets, which would further boost gross
wealth as a result of capital gains. But higher gross wealth would lead to
more borrowing,which,if it grows at a slower pace than assets,would aug-
ment net wealth.Realized capital gains would boost real disposable income,
and a second round would be set in motion. Every subsequent round of
higher real disposable income and net wealth would stimulate additional
consumption, so that in the new long-run equilibrium, consumption,
income, savings, and wealth are higher than in the initial equilibrium.
The Investment Model
The investment model is summarized in Figure 6. Shocks to the invest-
ment spiral are introduced by monetary policy through changes in inter-
est rates and fiscal policy; by direct measures, such as depreciation
incentives on investment; or by indirect measures that influence demand,
such as changes in tax rates and government expenditures. If the shock
arises from a change in monetary policy, it will increase demand and
reduce the cost of capital that stimulates investment directly. If the shock
stems from personal-sector tax cuts or from increases in government
expenditure, demand is also stimulated and the effect could be permanent
(e.g., if deficit spending is sustained). If the shock consists of depreciation
incentives, like those that were implemented in 2001 and 2003, the effect
on investment is direct and timely.
Higher growth boosts production immediately if inventories are lean,
or, after a fashion, if inventories are high. Higher output lifts capacity uti-
lization and corporate profits, which raise the net worth of the corporate
sector and may induce increased borrowing. All of these factors, with the
exception of borrowing, will boost investment, which, in turn, boosts
demand,so a second round is set in motion.In each round,the increase in
investment becomes smaller and the loop converges to a new long-runThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 23
equilibrium. The increase in investment from any shock is not explosive
because the investment spiral is stable.
It is clear that investment depends on six variables: four short-run
variables (capacity utilization,industrial production,corporate profits,and
interest rates) and two long-run variables (debt-to-investment ratio and,in
the corporate sector,net-worth-to-GDP ratio).Financial factors are crucial
determinants of investment, as exemplified in the works of Keynes (1936),
Brainard and Tobin (1968), Tobin (1969, 1978), and Mayer (1994).
We propose that capacity utilization is mostly affected by industrial
production, and that the association is strongly positive. In our modeling
strategy, Keynes’s “animal spirits” and “uncertainty of expectations”
hypotheses critically influence investment, but the relationships work,
basically,through industrial production and profitability variables that are
critical in determining gross investment and capacity utilization.
Industrial production and capacity utilization were the main determi-
nants of investment in the demand-led business cycles,while corporate prof-
itability and real interest rates were additional variables that were required to
explain investment in the supply-led business cycles. Moreover, long-run
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factors were also needed to explain investment in the last two cycles. The
structure of our model is unique,which implies that the importance of each
variable in explaining investment has remained stable in all business cycles,
but the volatility of the variables in each business cycle has been different.
The Long-Term Risks to Consumption and Investment
To assess the long-term risks to consumption, we simultaneously simu-
lated our consumption model outlined above, along with our wage-price
model and our house-price model (see Arestis and Karakitsos 2004 for full
details). The wage-price model is essential because wages and salaries in
private industries account for more than half of personal income,and CPI
inflation, which is used to calculate real disposable income, is endogenous
to the model. The housing model is also essential because of the relation-
ship between the housing market and net wealth.
To assess the long-term risks to investment, we conducted a number
of simulations using our investment model outlined above, our profits
model, our wage-price model, and our model of existing and expected
business intentions based on surveys conducted by the Institute of Supply
Management (ibid.).
The models to which we have just referred, were simulated under two
alternative scenarios:
Scenario I (weak recovery in 2004): What would happen to consumption
and investment if the current recovery faltered in 2004 and once again
became anemic?
Scenario II (strong recovery in 2004):What would happen to consumption
and investment if the recovery that started after the Iraq war remained
strong throughout 2004?
A.Underlying Assumptions Affecting Consumption
1. Scenario I (Weak Recovery in 2004)
The essence of this scenario lies in the assumption that the economic
strength of the second and third quarters of 2003 resulted from one-off
factors related to the fiscal package of the current administration (the Jobs
and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act) and rising confidence related toThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 25
lower geopolitical risks following the end of the Iraq war. The fiscal stim-
ulus provided through depreciation incentives and tax relief is estimated
to be 1.6 percent of nominal GDP. The Fed also eased monetary policy in
June 2003 when it cut the federal funds rate to 1 percent.
The torrid 8-percent growth rate in the third quarter of 2003 was
caused by such one-off factors as strong consumption owing to income tax
cuts; the last-wagon effect of companies taking advantage of depreciation
incentives on new structures; and improving confidence because of lower
geopolitical risk. We expect the accommodative stance of fiscal and mone-
tary policy to continue to support the economic recovery,but sector imbal-
ances and the dissipation of one-off factors will cause the recovery to falter
during 2004. Nonetheless, we expect the U.S. economy will grow at poten-
tial output (an average rate of 3 percent) during the 2004–2005 period.
We believe that the Fed should tighten monetary policy in the second
quarter of 2004, whereupon bond yields would rise to 6.5 percent by the
end of 2004 before falling back to 6 percent by the end of 2005, as a result
of weakness in the housing market (and rising 30-year mortgage rates).
Financial assets are assumed to grow modestly at 5 percent,while tangible
assets, other than property, and other personal income are assumed to
grow at the same pace as the recent past. Debt accumulation is assumed
to slow over the next two years, while wages and salaries in the govern-
ment sector are assumed to follow their recent downward trend. Net
transfer payments (subsidies less personal contributions for social secu-
rity) are hypothesized to grow at the same rate as in 2003, because we
assume that the government will resist pressure to lower subsidies to low
income groups in an election year. On the further assumption that the
recent temporary tax cuts become permanent, the ratio of personal taxes
to personal income is expected to remain unchanged.
Table 2 summarizes the assumptions underlying Scenario I, along
with their current values between September and December 2003. Under
these assumptions, the fiscal burden (taxes less subsidies) diminishes
gradually throughout the period, and the pace of job creation is strong
(approximately 170,000 new jobs per month). Wage inflation continues
to decline in 2004, partly because of abating CPI inflation and partly
because real wage rates exceed their equilibrium values. This trend
reverses in 2005 as inflation picks up and excess labor demand puts26 Public Policy Brief, No. 77
upward pressure on wages. Real disposable income growth decelerates
after August 2004, however, as the effect of previous tax cuts unwinds.
While net wealth of the personal sector increases in 2004, it declines in
2005. The rate of growth of consumer confidence peaks in the spring of
2004 and falls thereafter. Unemployment remains steady, as job creation
brings many discouraged workers back to the labor force. Under these
assumptions, consumption peaks early in 2004 and decelerates to the end
of 2005,but it is still growing at 3 percent by the end of 2004 and will help
the current administration in the forthcoming presidential election (see
Arestis and Karakitsos 2004 for full details on the aspects touched upon
in this paragraph).
2. Scenario II (Strong Recovery in 2004)
The essence of Scenario II lies in the premise that a combined fiscal and
monetary stimulus lasts at least one year (probably 18 months) before
tapering off. The accommodative stance of monetary policy prevents
long-term interest rates from rising and prolongs the effects of the fiscal
Table 2  Effects on Consumption
Scenario I  Scenario II
Current Values  (Weak  (Strong         
Assumptions Sept.–Dec. 03 Recovery) Recovery)      
Other Personal Income 3.0 1st Year 3.0 4.0
(% YoY) 2nd Year 3.0 2.0
Net Transfer Payments 7.3 1st Year 7.3 8.3
(% YoY) 2nd Year 7.3 6.3
Personal Taxes 11.2 1st Year 11.2 10.2
(% of Personal Income) 2nd Year 11.2 12.2
Wages & Salaries in Government 3.2 1st Year 2.5 3.0
(% YoY) 2nd Year 2.5 2.0
Financial Assets 5.3 1st Year 5.0 10.0
(% YoY) 2nd Year 0.0 -5.0
Tangible Assets other than Property 0.1 1st Year 2.0 3.0
(% YoY) 2nd Year 2.0 1.0
Liabilities other than Mortgages 2.4 1st Year 2.0 2.0
(% of Disposable Income) 2nd Year 1.0 1.0
30-year Mortgage Rate 5.9 1st Year 6.5 7.5
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stimulus. Despite the fact that short-term interest rates are at a 40-year
low, long-term interest rates have risen sharply since June 2003 and the
yield curve is extremely steep. If interest rates stay high or rise further,
which is very likely, the stimulus from fiscal policy will peter out. This
means that growth diminishes in 2005 and beyond, all things being equal.
The growth rate of industrial production averages 4.6 percent in 2004,but
falls to 1.4 percent in 2005. The average growth rate over the 2004–2005
period is the same as Scenario I (3 percent), but it is relatively stronger in
2004 and weaker in 2005.
Paradoxically,the higher growth rate implies that the Fed could afford
to wait until after the November 2004 presidential election before tighten-
ing monetary policy. The explanation of this paradox is that inflation
remains muted with strong growth, whereas inflation falls more in 2004
and rises more sharply in 2005 with slow growth. Although there is no
trade-off between growth and inflation, there is a trade-off between the
volatility of growth and inflation. Scenario I implies low growth volatility
and high inflation volatility, whereas Scenario II implies high growth
volatility and low inflation volatility. High growth volatility would cause
high volatility in real disposable income growth, gross and net wealth, and
consumption.
Net transfer payments in Scenario II are assumed to grow at almost
the same rate as Scenario I.We assume,however,that personal taxes are cut
relatively more in 2004, but rise in 2005 to curb the ballooning budget
deficit. These fiscal policy assumptions cause the fiscal burden of the per-
sonal sector to fall much more in 2004, but to rise in 2005, as some relief
measures are probably reversed in a post-election year. Similarly, wages
and salaries in the government sector fall relatively less in 2004, but rise
relatively more in 2005, although the average for the two-year period is
assumed to be the same as in Scenario I.
Other personal income and financial and tangible assets, other than
property, are assumed to grow relatively faster in 2004, but slower in 2005,
as house prices decline and the economy slows. Again, the average for the
two-year period is the same as in Scenario I, but the volatility is higher.
Under these assumptions, wage earnings and employment increase
more in 2004, but less in 2005 in line with inflation, excess demand for
labor,and growth.Given that the fiscal burden is lower in 2004 and higherThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 29
in 2005, real disposable income growth is higher and much lower, respec-
tively. Unemployment declines more in 2004, but rises in 2005.
House prices continue to rise in 2004, but fall more sharply in 2005.
The combination of falling house and financial asset prices reduces gross
wealth in 2005 and induces households to repay their debts. Therefore, net
wealth is higher than in Scenario I.
As a result of these developments in real disposable income, unem-
ployment,consumer confidence,and interest rates,consumption is stronger
in 2004,but falls precipitously and drags the economy into recession toward
the end of 2005.
B.Underlying Assumptions Affecting Investment
The four models used to simultaneously simulate the effects on investment
incorporated the following assumptions: (1) corporate debt and net worth
remain unchanged from the third quarter of 2003; (2) there is no further
news on economic fundamentals,so the purchasing manager’s index,based
on a survey of business intentions, follows its own momentum, peaking at 
the beginning of 2004 and returning to equilibrium by the end of 2005;
(3) industrial production continues to gather steam, and its growth rate
peaks at almost 10 percent in October 2004, but the rate decelerates there-
after, reaching zero by the end of 2005; (4) profits decline throughout the
period; (5) investment accelerates in the first quarter, but decelerates to
almost 7 percent by the end of 2004 and to less than 2 percent by the end of
2005; and (6) capacity utilization climbs throughout 2004 and peaks at 80
percent before declining moderately in 2005.
In a second set of simulations,we used the investment model (with indus-
trial production exogenous), the profits model, and the wage-price model.
1. Scenario I (Weak Recovery in 2004)
We expect the Fed to tighten monetary policy in the second quarter of
2004, with the prime lending rate climbing to 4.5 percent from 4 percent.
The rate of debt accumulation continues to be less than the rate of eco-
nomic growth,owing to the budget deficit,so the debt-to-investment ratio
falls slightly (from 624 percent in the third quarter of 2003 to 615 percent).
Balance-sheet restructuring, along with declining profitability, erodes thenet worth of the corporate sector (from 88.5 percent in the third quarter
of 2003 to 84 percent by the end of 2005).
Table 3 summarizes the assumptions underlying Scenario I, along
with their current values between September and December 2003. Profits
decelerate rapidly to –6.2 percent by the end of 2005.Investment peaks in the
first quarter of 2004 and decelerates rapidly to a meager 1-percent rate
before recovering. Capacity utilization continues to recover throughout the
two-year period.
The conclusion of this simulation is that investment is near its peak, as
the buoyant rate of the past six months resulted from one-off factors.
Economic fundamentals deteriorate in 2004, as the Fed will likely tighten
monetary policy,profitability declines,and the corporate sector continues to
restructure its balance sheets. Part of the reason for the risk to investment
lies in the assumption of falling profitability, owing to robust job creation.
Although growth is assumed to be weaker than the alternative scenario, it is
still near potential output and is sufficient to induce companies to hire at the
rate of 170,000 new employees per month. If companies are more cautious
in hiring,then profits do not fall as much and the risk to investment is lower.
2. Scenario II (Strong Recovery in 2004)
With strong economic recovery in 2004, the prime lending rate remains at
4 percent before rising to 5 percent in 2005.Corporate profits fall less dras-
tically in 2004, but more strongly in 2005 than in Scenario I. Strong eco-
nomic growth induces companies to expand borrowing in 2004, but
reduce borrowing in 2005.The volatility of the debt-to-investment ratio is
assumed to be higher than in Scenario I. The net worth of the corporate
sector remains unchanged in 2004,but improves in 2005.Capacity utiliza-
tion rises to a higher rate in 2004 before converging to the rate in Scenario
I by the end of 2005 (see Figure 7). The overall effect of these factors is
strong, investment growth throughout 2004 (9 percent by the end of the
year), but with some volatility. However, investment decelerates rapidly in
2005 and falls below the level in Scenario I (see Figure 8).
The overall conclusion of the rapid-growth scenario is that invest-
ment remains very strong in 2004, but falls precipitously in 2005.
Economic fundamentals are relatively better in 2004, but worse in 2005,
which explains the stark difference in the risk to investment between the
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two scenarios. Investment is obviously better in Scenario II than in
Scenario I, which shows no change in economic fundamentals.
Summary and Conclusions
The recent recession was very mild, thanks to the resilience of the con-
sumer.This is partly due to the buoyancy of real disposable income,which
was boosted through easy fiscal policy, and partly due to the buoyancy of
the housing market, which was boosted by the low interest rates. During
the double-dip recession of the industrial sector,caused by a second round
of retrenchment, slower growth in real disposable income caused a decel-
eration in consumption growth. The picture changed markedly, however,
in the second half of 2003. The corporate sector has been successful in
Figure 7  Capacity Utilization–Short-Run Equilibrium
Source: Authors’ calculations
(January of Each Year)
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restoring profitability and improving balance sheets, so wages have risen
and job creation has resumed. The latest round of tax cuts has bolstered
real disposable income, and all the short-run factors affecting consump-
tion have improved.
As a result of the phenomenal boom in the property market, gross
wealth is higher than at the peak of the equity market in March 2000. But
net wealth, which matters in terms of consumption, is still 3.5 percent
($1.5 trillion) lower because the property boom was financed by debt
accumulation, which is at an all-time high.
There is a risk to consumption if economic growth in 2004 turns out
to be very strong as a result of a further boost by fiscal policy. Investment
would soften in 2005 because of higher long-term interest rates, and
Figure 8  Real Gross Private Domestic Investment– Short-Run 
Equilibrium
Source: Authors’ calculations
(January of Each Year)
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profitability would decline as a result of strong job creation in 2004. The
worsening outlook for the corporate sector may raise the savings ratio and
adversely affect consumption, while higher long-term interest rates may
lower housing and financial asset prices. This scenario would be aggra-
vated by debt-servicing costs, which are at an all-time high in spite of his-
torically low interest rates.
A strong economy at the end of 2004 would provide an incentive for
the government to tighten fiscal policy and curb the budget deficit in a
post-election year. If this event happened, then a slowing economy com-
bined with tight fiscal policy would result in another recession.
The conclusion is that slow growth in 2004 is better than rapid growth,
as growth at potential output would keep a cap on long-term interest rates
and would not jeopardize investment, the housing market, and economic
growth in 2005.The long-term risk to consumption stems from procyclical
fiscal policy (i.e., continuous easing in the upswing of the business cycle).
In the current recovery,investment is growing at a slower pace than any
other business cycle. In the six-month period following the Iraq war, how-
ever, the short- and long-run factors affecting investment have improved.
Our analysis suggests that the double-dip recession in the industrial sector
has helped to turn the short-run factors positive. Labor costs continue to
fall, profit margins and corporate profits have improved, and lean invento-
ries in the face of higher demand have increased industrial production.
Higher economic growth is finally taking care of the excess capacity that was
installed in the euphoria years of the 1990s. Hence our short-run analysis
suggests that investment should remain buoyant in 2004.
Our long-run analysis shows that debt levels and leverage are higher
than before. The switch into long-term debt was helpful during the eco-
nomic downswing, but it has been a hindrance in recovery, as companies
have not benefited from the introduction of low interest rates by the Fed.
Credit risk soared after the bubble burst and the interest differential between
capital markets and banks widened.Those problems contributed to the ane-
mic recovery of investment in the business cycle following the 2001 reces-
sion. However, the long-run factors have improved dramatically in the last
six months. Companies have quickly restructured their balance sheets, and
debt levels have declined in line with brisk economic growth. Interest rates
are lower than other business cycles, debt servicing is at the lowest rate inThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 35
30 years, and credit risk has abated. The improvement in the long-run
factors has paved the way for a sustained recovery of investment.
The conclusion of Scenario I is that investment is near its peak, as
buoyant economic growth in the last six months is a result of one-off
factors.Part of the risk to investment is falling profitability from robust job
creation. The conclusion of Scenario II is that investment remains strong
in 2004, but falls precipitously in 2005, and high growth volatility causes
high investment volatility.
The two sets of simulations conducted for this brief show that the cur-
rent accommodating stance of fiscal and monetary policy is probably suf-
ficient for the economy to be booming at the time of the presidential
election in November 2004. But the long-term hazard is that the current
U.S. administration would not risk an economy growing only at potential
output by the end of 2004. It is therefore considering an additional fiscal
package to stimulate the economy before the election, which would raise
the risk of even higher long-term interest rates and foster forces that would
ultimately weaken investment in 2005 and beyond.
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